Administrative Appeal Decision - Munroe, Jamel (2020-02-13) by unknown
Fordham Law School 
FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History 
Parole Administrative Appeal Decisions Parole Administrative Appeal Documents 
May 2021 
Administrative Appeal Decision - Munroe, Jamel (2020-02-13) 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/aad 
Recommended Citation 
"Administrative Appeal Decision - Munroe, Jamel (2020-02-13)" (2021). Parole Information Project 
https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/aad/692 
This Parole Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Parole Administrative Appeal Documents 
at FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Parole 
Administrative Appeal Decisions by an authorized administrator of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of 
Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
STATE OF NEW YORK -BOARD OF PAROLE 
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE 






Appearances: Norman P. Effman, Esq. 
·Wyoming County-Attica Legal Aid Bureau 
. 18 Linwood A venue· 
Warsaw, NY 14569 
Decision appealed: May 2019 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 12 months. 
--·-...-~Board MemberCsl . 
who participated: 
Papers considered: AppellanCs Brief received October 1, 2019 
Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unifs Findings and Recommendation 
Records relied upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole 
-Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMP AS instrument, Offender Case 
Plan. . 
Fi~~ ;be undersigned determine that the decision appealed is hereby: 
(Jk:C ~rmOO _ Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to ___ _ 
Commissioner 
?~-'~/ V Affirmed _ Vacated, remanded for de novo inter~iew _ ~odlfied to----
_Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to ___ _ 
. . 
. If the Fi.nal Determination is at variance with Findiµgs and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written 
reasons for the Parole Board's determination must be annexed hereto. - --(_ '~· --
~:..~ .-~-- ....... . 
This Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the separate findings of 
the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any, on o>luJ.zo~o @· 
D istribution: Appeals Unit-Appellant - Appellant's <;ounsel - Inst. Parole File - Central File 
P-2002(B) (11 /2018) 
STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE 
APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION 
Name: Munroe, Jamel DIN: 17-R-1201  
Facility: Wyoming CF AC No.:  05-219-19 B 
    
Findings: (Page 1 of 4) 
 
Appellant challenges the May 2019 determination of the Board, denying release and imposing 
a 12-month hold. The instant offense involved Appellant possessing cocaine with intent to sell 
while two children under the age of 17 were in the same residence. Appellant raises the following 
issues: 1) the decision was arbitrary, capricious, and irrational bordering on impropriety because 
it was based on the instant offense and Appellant’s criminal record without considering all of the 
required factors; 2) the Board’s decision was based upon boilerplate conclusory assertions and 
lacked detail; 3) the Board impermissibly resentenced Appellant based on their personal views; 4) 
the Board disregarded the COMPAS and forward-focused intent of the 2011 changes to the 
Executive Law; and 5) the Board failed to overcome the presumption of release created by 
Appellant’s receipt of an EEC. These arguments are without merit.  
 
As an initial matter, discretionary release to parole is not to be granted “merely as a reward for 
good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a 
reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without 
violating the law, and that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so 
deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the law.”  Executive Law § 259-
i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 
A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014).  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the 
Board to consider criteria which is relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the 
inmate’s institutional record and criminal behavior.  People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. 
of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983). In this case, the appellant received an 
EEC, therefore the deprecation standard does not apply here. 
 
While consideration of these factors is mandatory, “the ultimate decision to parole a prisoner is 
discretionary.”  Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000).  
Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the Board’s 
discretion.  See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 
2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 717; Matter of Garcia v. New 
York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997). The 
Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give them equal weight.  Matter of 
Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of LeGeros 
v. New York State Bd. Of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of 
Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st Dept. 2007).  In the absence 
of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory factors, it must be 
presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty.  Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 A.D.2d 914, 914, 
680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole, 204 
A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. Of Parole, 
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157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 
128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881. 
 
An EEC does not automatically entitle an inmate to discretionary release or eliminate 
consideration of the statutory factors including the instant offense.  Matter of Corley v. New York 
State Div. of Parole, 33 A.D.3d 1142, 1143, 822 N.Y.S.2d 817, 818 (3d Dept. 2006); Matter of 
Pearl v. New York State Div. of Parole, 25 A.D.3d 1058, 808 N.Y.S.2d 816, 817 (3d Dept. 2006); 
Matter of White v. Dennison, 29 A.D.3d 1144, 814 N.Y.S.2d 393 (3d Dept. 2006).  Moreover, the 
Board is not required to give each factor equal weight.  Matter of Corley, 33 A.D.3d 1142, 1143, 
822 N.Y.S.2d 817, 818; Matter of Pearl, 25 A.D.3d 1058, 808 N.Y.S.2d 816, 817.  The Board may 
deny release to parole on a finding that there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is 
released, the inmate will not live and remain at liberty without violating the law and that his release 
is not compatible with the welfare of society.  Correction Law § 805; Matter of Heitman v. New 
York State Bd. of Parole, 214 A.D.2d 673, 625 N.Y.S.2d 264 (2d Dept. 1995); Matter of Salcedo 
v. Ross, 183 A.D.2d 771, 771, 583 N.Y.S.2d 502, 503 (2d Dept. 1992); Matter of Walker v. Russi, 
176 A.D.2d 1185, 576 N.Y.S.2d 51 (3d Dept. 1991), appeal dismissed, 79 N.Y.2d 89 7, 581 
N.Y.S.2d 660 (1992). 
 
The record as a whole, including the interview transcript, reflects that the Board considered the 
appropriate factors, including: the instant offense of Criminal Possession of a Controlled Substance 
in the third degree; Appellant’s criminal history filled with drug-related offenses including four 
prior state terms of incarceration and a life sentence for a prior drug-related offense; his 
institutional efforts including  receipt of an EEC and completion of ART ; and release 
plans to seek housing and assistance from the Ready, Willing & Able program. The Board also 
had before it and considered, among other things, the COMPAS instrument, the case plan, a letter 
from the District Attorney, and Appellant’s parole packet including letters of support/assurance 
and release plans.  
 
After considering all required factors, the Board acted within its discretion in determining release 
would not satisfy the standards provided for by Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A).  In reaching its 
conclusion, the Board permissibly relied on the instant offense, Appellant’s criminal history, and 
Appellant’s lack of insight as to why he returned to selling and using drugs considering his life 
sentence for a prior drug-related offense. See Matter of Boccadisi v. Stanford, 133 A.D.3d 1169, 20 
N.Y.S.3d 477 (3d Dept. 2015); Matter of Montane v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866 
(3d Dept. 2014); Matter of Davis v. Evans, 105 A.D.3d 1305, 963 N.Y.S.2d 485 (3d Dept. 2013); 
Matter of Lashway v. Evans, 110 A.D.3d 1417, 1418, 974 N.Y.S.2d 164, 165 (3d Dept. 2013); 
Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204 (3d Dept. 
1990); Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 478, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704 (2000); Matter of 
STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE 
APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION 
Name: Munroe, Jamel DIN: 17-R-1201  
Facility: Wyoming CF AC No.:  05-219-19 B 
    
Findings: (Page 3 of 4) 
 
Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); 
Matter of Beodeker v. Stanford, 164 A.D.3d 1555, 82 N.Y.S.3d 669 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of 
Crawford v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 144 A.D.3d 1308, 46 N.Y.S.3d 228 (3d Dept. 2016), 
lv. denied, 29 N.Y.3d 901 (2017). The Board also cited the COMPAS instrument’s elevated scores 
for substance abuse and criminal involvement. See Matter of Espinal v. N.Y. State Bd. Of Parole, 
172 A.D.3d 1816, 100 N.Y.S.3d 777 (3d Dept. 2019); Matter of Bush v. Annucci, 148 A.D.3d 
1392, 50 N.Y.S.3d 180 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Wade v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1487, 52 
N.Y.S.3d 508 (3d Dept. 2017). The Board acted within its discretion in determining these 
considerations rebutted any presumption created by the EEC and rendered discretionary release 
inappropriate at this time.   See generally Matter of Neal v. Stanford, 131 A.D.3d 1320, 16 N.Y.S.3d 
342 (3d Dept. 2015).   
 
The Board’s decision satisfied the criteria set out in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a), as it was 
sufficiently detailed to inform the inmate of the reasons for the denial of parole.  Matter of Applegate 
v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of 
Kozlowski v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 108 A.D.3d 435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dept. 2013); 
Matter of Little v. Travis, 15 A.D.3d 698, 788 N.Y.S.2d 628 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Davis v. 
Travis, 292 A.D.2d 742, 739 N.Y.S.2d 300 (3d Dept. 2002); People ex rel. Herbert v. New York 
State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).   
 
Appellant’s assertion that the denial of parole release amounted to an improper resentencing is 
without merit inasmuch as the Board fulfilled its obligation to determine the propriety of release 
per Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) and after considering the factors set forth therein.  Executive 
Law § 259 et seq.; Penal Law § 70.40; Matter of Murray v. Evans, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 
745 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Crews v. New York State Exec. Dept. Bd. of Parole Appeals Unit, 
281 A.D.2d 672, 720 N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dept. 2001).  The Board was vested with discretion to 
determine whether release was appropriate notwithstanding the minimum period of incarceration 
set by the Court.  Matter of Burress v. Dennison, 37 A.D.3d 930, 829 N.Y.S.2d 283 (3d Dept. 
2007); Matter of Cody v. Dennison, 33 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 822 N.Y.S.2d 677 (3d Dept. 2006), lv. 
denied, 8 N.Y.3d 802, 830 N.Y.S.2d 698 (2007).  The appellant has not in any manner been 
resentenced.  Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 
N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016). We also note the Board did not rely on personal penal philosophy. 
 
Appellant’s contention that the Board disregarded the COMPAS and forward-focused intent of 
the 2011 changes to the Executive Law is without merit. The 2011 amendments require procedures 
incorporating risk and needs principles to “assist” the Board in making parole release decisions.  
Executive Law § 259–c(4).  The Board satisfies this requirement in part by using the COMPAS 
instrument.  Matter of Montane v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 870 (3d Dept. 
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2014); see also Matter of Hawthorne v. Stanford, 135 A.D.3d 1036, 1042, 22 N.Y.S.3d 640, 645 
(3d Dept. 2016); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 
N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 1559, 985 N.Y.S.2d 
386, 387 (4th Dept. 2014).  This is encompassed in the Board’s regulations.  9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 
8002.2(a).   However, the COMPAS is not predictive and was never intended to be the sole 
indicator of risk and needs as the Board gets risk and needs information from a variety of sources, 
including the statutory factors and the interview.  Notably, the 2011 amendments did not eliminate 
the requirement that the Board conduct a case-by-case review of each inmate by considering the 
statutory factors including the instant offense.  The amendments also did not change the three 
substantive standards that the Board is required to apply when deciding whether to grant parole.  
Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A).  Thus, the COMPAS cannot mandate a particular result.  Matter 
of King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016).  Rather, the COMPAS is 
an additional consideration that the Board must weigh along with the statutory factors for the 
purposes of deciding whether the three standards are satisfied.  See Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State 
Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dept. 2014); accord Matter of Dawes 
v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. 
Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017).  That is exactly what occurred here.  
 
In conclusion, Appellant has failed to demonstrate the Board’s decision was not made in 
accordance with the pertinent statutory requirements or was irrational “bordering on impropriety.”  
Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 476, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704 (2000) (quoting Matter of 
Russo v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980)). 
 
Recommendation:  Affirm. 
